## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS OFFICE OF THEADISTICION PERCENIE as el 2004/05/25 : CIA-RD

DATE: 22 May 1974

TO: The Director

FROM: GACarver. Jr.

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

As requested, I have looked over your proposed note to Andy Marshall and suggested a few emendations (written in green ink so that they may be easily identified and ignored). I also offer -- free of charge -- a proposed penultimate paragraph which you may want to use in some form or may want to reject as being worth what it cost.

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George A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officer

Att

DCI/NIO/GACarver:ks

Distribution:

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Actually, the specific example mentioned above is but one illustration of a larger conceptual problem: our penchant for forcing our analyses of foreigners and their actions/behavior/organizational approaches into Procrustean conceptual molds derived from our own experience. Our books on Communist Forces in Vietnam, for instance, were kept the way we thought such books ought to be kept -- which was not the way the Communists themselves kept their books. If Warsaw Pact Forces have, as they do, an Air Defense component, should we not take this as a given instead of trying to divide this component into "Army" and "Air Force" portions because we have an Army and an Air Force but not an Air Defense Force. My point is that our analysis of foreign intentions/capabilities/behavior in general would probably be better and closer to reality if it ran with the grain of the conceptual/structural outlook these foreigners use themselves.